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Abstract
According to the modern synthesis (MS), evolution is the gradual change of gene frequencies in a population. The MS is 
closely allied to adaptationist explanations of phenotypes, where organismic form and behavior is treated as previously 
selected for and owes its genesis to some remote past. However, some new theories of evolution broadly aligned with 
the extended evolutionary synthesis (EES), in particular developmental plasticity theory and niche construction theory, 
foreground the fact that evolution is sometimes much more rapid than previously imagined, and occurs through the active 
engagement of organisms accommodating and modifying their environments. This article describes how these contemporary 
theories reveal two interconnected sides of being an adaptive subject, a situated agent that modifies itself and its environment 
as it lives, and contributes to evolution in turn. MS and adaptationism have a generic logical structure that can be taught 
anywhere, but because developmental plasticity theory and niche construction theory point to an ontology that foregrounds 
the agency of the organism, they benefit from in situ exploration. I argue biology as a subject needs to adapt, and call for the 
renewed importance of field studies, outlining some elements of how such studies might be conceived. I close by consider-
ing how understanding organisms as adaptive subjects of evolution has important implications for sustainability education.
Keywords Biological agency · Developmental plasticity theory · Niche construction theory · Outdoor learning · 
Sustainability education
Introduction
Millions of biology students have been taught the view 
(from population genetics) that "evolution is change in 
gene frequencies." …This view forces the explanation 
toward mathematics and abstract descriptions of genes, 
and away from butterflies and zebras ….The evolution 
of form is the main drama of life’s story, both as found 
in the fossil record and in the diversity of living spe-
cies. So, let’s teach that story. (Carroll 2005, p. 294)
The standard version of evolution Carroll describes is 
known as the modern synthesis (MS). The MS emerged 
as a powerful conceptual integration of Mendelian inher-
itance and Darwinian natural selection, via statistical rea-
soning provided by population genetics (Mayr and Provine 
1981). The theory depended on a mechanism for inheritance, 
for novelty, and for spread. Mendelian genetics was identi-
fied as the mode of inheritance needed to ensure Darwinian 
descent with modification, randomly mutated genes of small 
effect were seen as the cause of evolutionary novelty, while 
populational studies investigated the ways inherited genes 
could spread (or not) within a population. Key to the syn-
thesis was the acceptance of the Weismannian barrier, which 
asserted no environmental influences shaping development 
could be transmitted to an organism’s germline. The result 
was a conception of evolution that rendered development 
and the phenotypic organism largely irrelevant for evolution-
ary studies (Walsh 2015). MS is taught as the primary expla-
nation of evolution in school science curricula (McVaugh 
et al. 2011; Lehrer and Schauble 2012) and in my experience 
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versions of it are also taught by many outdoor and environ-
mental educators.
When the qualitatively abrupt discontinuities revealed in 
studies of Mendelian heredity became well known to biolo-
gists, they were initially thought to present a challenge to the 
long and gradual nature of change hypothesized in Darwin-
ian evolution, which depended on the accumulation of ben-
eficial micromutations over long periods of time (Bateson 
1894). A group of mathematically trained biologists worked 
out that the two were not in fact dissonant when studied at 
the population level (Fisher 1918; Haldane 1927; Wright 
1932). The focus of their work, which culminated in the 
MS, examined how random heritable variations get passed 
on, spread, or diluted in large breeding populations. At the 
time, genes were considered hereditary factors associated 
with phenotypic traits. When molecular biology rose to 
prominence, biologists struggled to map these allegedly phe-
notypic genes with actual material entities in the genome. 
This was because individual coding sequences in the DNA 
rarely had specific, context-independent phenotypic expres-
sion (Moss 2003). The Modern Synthesis itself had to 
evolve to incorporate the dynamics of the newly discovered 
molecular genes in populations instead of the Mendelian 
phenotype-associated genes. The result was a gene-selec-
tionist approach to evolutionary theory, developed initially 
by Hamilton (1964) and Williams (1966), and popularized 
by Dawkins (1976). The phenotype was seen as too messy 
and contingent, and the adaptationist logic could more eas-
ily be applied to genes themselves, which were now seen 
as heritable, mutating and replicating entities conceived to 
behave in a much more “Darwinian” way than organisms 
(Dawkins 1982). While more recent genomic studies are 
less atomistic, incorporating noncoding regulatory regions 
of DNA into their analysis, the result is the same. The organ-
ism has fallen out of focus, treated as an epiphenomenon or 
irrelevance, or as a mere vehicle for the causally efficacious 
DNA elements, with the evolutionary change occurring at 
the biochemical level.
In emphasizing interactants and histories not immediately 
observable, the MS also effectively took evolutionary study 
indoors. According to the MS, the main players in evolu-
tion are microscopic genes or gigantic abstract populations 
(Walsh 2015). Neither can be directly perceived in the world. 
Meanwhile, the temporal context of important events in evo-
lutionary process are almost always deferred to the remote 
past. Contra Darwin and his contemporaries, who were 
avid naturalists studying real organisms in real contexts, 
the practice of evolutionary theory became an increasingly 
decontextualized discipline to be studied through micro-
scopes, mathematical formulas, and computer simulations. 
The outdoors was swept from theory, and with it the zebras 
and the butterflies from education about evolution. As this 
was unfolding, field studies, zoology, botany, and natural 
history were increasingly replaced in universities by courses 
on biochemistry, genomics, and molecular biology. Biology 
became just another sort of indoor chemistry.
Those few who still do teach natural history outdoors 
have not escaped the lure of MS reasoning. Even when 
the form and function of species is discussed in less for-
mal educational contexts such as interpretive centers, in my 
experience adaptationist explanations influenced by the MS 
clearly dominate. Adaptationist explanation stems directly 
from Darwin’s (1859) most famous insight into the nature 
of biological evolution. According to Darwin, diversity in a 
population of organisms implies varying degrees of fitness. 
The “selection pressures” in the population’s environment 
ensure that not all will be able to reliably or equally pass on 
their traits to their descendants. Those that do thrive and 
reproduce will gradually increase the prevalence of benefi-
cial traits in the population. Over many generations, certain 
stable forms, functions, and behaviors are thought to emerge 
in a species and persist because the selective regime has not 
changed. While Darwin was a pluralist when it came to evo-
lutionary mechanisms, adaptationism alone fit the neat logic 
of the MS paradigm. In keeping with this logic, it is common 
to hear an environmental educator offer an explanation such 
as: “this species has trait X because X provided a selective 
advantage to it. It was able to breed and pass on more of the 
genes that produced X and outcompete those which did not 
have it.” The efficient cause of the trait is deep in the genes, 
its origin deep in the past. As I see it, one of the crucial rea-
sons for this deferral is a pervasive conflation of a historical 
and an ahistorical conception of the term “adaptation” in 
its use in biology (Kampourakis 2013). According to this 
author, biology teachers use the word adaptation to refer to 
both a trait that is the product of prior natural selection, and 
to refer to the survival advantage a trait confers to an organ-
ism in current environmental conditions. When conflated, 
one comes to implicitly assume the relationship between 
the organism’s current traits and environment is merely 
replaying an already established correspondence. There 
is, consequently, no commonly accepted term to even talk 
about beneficial responses an organism learns or produces 
during its ontogenic history of interactions with its environ-
ment. Whatever might be going on for the first time in the 
organism interacting with its environment is backgrounded 
in thinking and blinded from sight.
The result is that in both formal biology curricula and 
informal environmental education contexts, the organism 
is inevitably presented as scarcely more than the mindless 
product of a mindless process. This turns out to be crucial for 
sustainability education because the concepts used to explain 
the natural world have consequences on people’s affective 
engagement with the world and thereby their actions towards 
it (Larson 2014). I suggest that interpreting the organismic 
behavior and interactions as a mindless process fails to 
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invite adequate sympathy for other species or admiration 
and care for the ecological processes they create. At best, 
it facilitates simplistic approaches to ecological problems, 
such as technological solutions that treat organisms as reli-
able producers of specific outputs: trees planted to sequester 
certain amounts of carbon dioxide, pigs genetically altered 
to produce less methane, or predators introduced to control 
pest populations. At worst, such an approach contributes 
to a strong form of human exceptionalism that might fur-
ther exacerbate destructive human activity. Adaptationist 
explanations tend to attenuate an ontological difference 
between humans, as free experiencing subjects and agents, 
and other species, as objects with behavior caused by the 
interaction of components selected for and integrated in a 
distant past. Considering other species as adapted objects 
may be methodologically fruitful for certain purposes (e.g., 
Godfrey-Smith 2001), but one side effect is it tends to reify 
the problematic mind/matter split along human/other spe-
cies lines. Given that up to a million species are currently 
threatened with extinction (Tollefson 2019), science educa-
tors need to urgently address how conceptual frames reify 
patterns of harmful behavior. Evolutionary theory can and 
should bridge biology and people’s affective lives, a point 
that will be explored later in the article.
If MS and its bedfellow adaptationism were empirically 
adequate, in the sense that most organism traits and behavior 
could be explained through them (see “empirical adapta-
tionism,” Godfrey-Smith 2001), it would be an important 
question whether we should modify how we teach about 
evolution for the purposes of averting destructive attitudes 
towards other species. Suppose two evolutionary explana-
tions offer exactly the same predictions but lead to very dif-
ferent conceptions and emotions about humans and their 
place in the world. In such a case, scientists often appeal to 
Occam’s razor, an aesthetic criterion, to settle what explana-
tion we should adopt. I believe a more ecologically benign 
theory, i.e., one with more ecological adequacy, should 
hold its weight against a neater, simpler, or more familiar 
theory of identical empirical or methodological value.1 
The 21st century requires a broader palette of criteria to 
assess, quite literally, the viability of explanations. Regard-
less, an increasing body of empirical evidence and theoreti-
cal advances suggest adaptationism’s explanatory scope is 
limited and a much larger suite of evolutionarily significant 
influences need to be considered in explaining the emer-
gence of observable traits and behaviors. I will briefly dis-
cuss how some significant supplements and disruptions to 
modern evolutionary theory, sometimes rallying under the 
term “extended evolutionary synthesis” (EES) (Pigliucci and 
Müller 2010; Laland et al. 2015), transform the adaptation-
ist argument. While not all EES approaches invite the need 
for outdoor learning provision, many do. I will focus on two 
influential and connected concepts: developmental plastic-
ity (West-Eberhard 2003) and niche construction (Lewontin 
1983; Odling-Smee et al. 2003). These concepts turn out to 
be very intuitive (much more so than the logic of Darwinian 
evolution) and more aligned with a pedagogical orientation 
aiming to acknowledge and appreciate the subjectivity (in 
Godfrey-Smith’s 2017 sense, see below) of other species. To 
be more precise, I hope to show that these concepts unify, 
revealing organisms as adaptive subjects rather than merely 
adapted objects. On the basis of such concepts, I argue for 
the need to take learning about evolution out beyond the cell 
wall: literally beyond the causally inflated DNA and into its 
larger contexts, but also figuratively beyond the confines of 
the classroom and into the real world where organisms can 
show their prowess, inventiveness, and ongoing contribu-
tions to the diversity of the world.
The Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (EES)
In recent years, accumulating theoretical developments and 
evidence suggest the adaptationist framework of the MS is 
an insufficient model for evolutionary process, and alterna-
tive approaches are gaining steam. Though still a disparate 
set of methodological and theoretical approaches, a prom-
ising new interdisciplinary research program has emerged. 
Some scholars seek to draw these threads together under the 
possible banner of EES (Pigliucci and Müller 2010; Laland 
et al. 2015; Müller 2017), while others believe a more radi-
cal dismissal of natural selection and its associated onto-
logical commitments is needed (Depew and Weber 2011; 
Walsh 2015). I shall not attempt to settle that debate here, 
but instead review some of the main currents within this 
emerging nexus of research programs.
An early critique of adaptationism put forth by Gould 
and Lewontin (1979) suggested that given the basic physi-
cal properties of biological systems, much of the form (and 
probably behavior) of the organism were likely by-products 
of other adaptive characteristics or morphological necessi-
ties (this latter possibility was pursued early on by D’Arcy 
Wentworth Thompson 1942). This idea has developed into 
several influential research programs (e.g., Goodwin 1997; 
Müller and Newman 2003; Arthur 2004). According to these 
authors, we misunderstand biology when we seek adaptive 
1 The situation gets more complicated when a theory has more eco-
logical adequacy but less (or very slightly less) empirical adequacy. 
For example, should we settle for a theory that has less predictive 
power but which leads to behavior that sustains the life support sys-
tems we depend upon? If so, in what conditions do we adopt such 
a theory, and when do we not? Moreover, if this implies a need for 
theoretical pluralism, how should we teach a pluralistic approach to 
scientific explanations? We need to develop pragmatic nuance in our 
thinking, asking what level of accuracy is needed, for what purposes, 
and to what effects.
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explanations for every trait.2 Gould and Lewontin’s (1979) 
paper gave rise to a more cautious consideration of spe-
cies traits and the explanations we give of them, which has 
spawned fertile areas of research both within and outside 
the MS. Given some trait, how would we know whether 
it evolved for adaptationist reasons, emerged out of some 
ontogenetic necessity, or simply emerged by evolutionary 
drift?3
More recently, a blossoming of diverse theoretical 
approaches to understanding evolution have come forth. 
These include EvoDevo theory (Müller and Newman 2003; 
Carroll 2005; Kirschner and Gerhart 2005; Gilbert et al. 
2015), multiple inheritance theory (Jablonka and Lamb 
2005), symbiotic theory (Margulis 1993; Gilbert et  al. 
2012), multilevel selection (Wilson 2010), phenotypic and 
developmental plasticity (West-Eberhard 2003; Pigliucci and 
Boudry 2010), the evolution of evolvability (Wagner and 
Altenberg 1996; Wagner 2007; Pigliucci 2008), the evolu-
tion of gene regulatory networks (Davidson 2006; Shapiro 
2011), and niche construction (Odling-Smee et al. 2003).
After giving a brief overview of these concepts, this arti-
cle will consider educational implications of developmen-
tal plasticity and niche construction theory. EvoDevo is the 
examination of how evolution and development mutually 
affect one another such that an explanation of one is not 
possible without appealing to the other. An amendment of 
it, known as EcoEvoDevo, seeks to articulate the feedback 
loops between evolution, development, and ecology (Gilbert 
et al. 2015). Multiple inheritance theory is the idea that, in 
addition to genetic inheritance, there are many other evo-
lutionarily significant factors that are passed on to further 
generations through (for example) epigenetic modifications 
to the genome, behavioral and parental effects, inherited 
niches, and inherited symbiotic communities (Jablonka and 
Lamb 2005). Symbiotic theory discusses how speciation 
and other important evolutionary processes are dependent 
upon or influenced by changes in microbial symbiosis (Gil-
bert et al. 2012). Multilevel selection examines whether and 
how adaptationist arguments can be employed to understand 
evolutionary processes at different scales (from the gene, to 
organisms, to group selection) and how these levels interact 
(Wilson 2010). Phenotypic and developmental plasticity 
is a subset of (Eco)EvoDevo focused on how organisms’ 
development produces evolutionarily significant novelty that 
can later (through non-Lamarckian means) get genetically 
encoded (West-Eberhard 2003). The evolution of evolv-
ability is concerned with the processes and mechanisms 
whereby variations in versatility at the genetic and other 
levels become themselves regulated (Wagner and Altenberg 
1996; Wagner 2007). The study of gene regulatory networks 
involves an examination of the varying ways genes become 
mutually implicated in phenotypic outcomes and also how 
gene expression is directed by the cellular and organismic 
behavior (Shapiro 2011). Finally, niche construction theory 
considers the many ways organisms actively and passively 
modify their environments and thereby change the selection 
pressures that affect them and other species in their ecologi-
cal communities (Odling-Smee et al. 2003).
The reader will observe that some of these approaches 
are more amenable to adaptationist arguments than others. 
For example, the evolvability of genetic code can be con-
sidered in relation to the adaptiveness of genetic variance, 
where too much (or too little) genetic variability leads to 
decreased viability and therefore fitness. Nevertheless, it 
should be clear that even in this case, a warning is issued for 
the educator keen to elicit off-the-cuff adaptationist hypoth-
eses about observable traits: particular behaviors or traits 
observed cannot be assumed to have been the consequence 
of prior evolution. It may well be the organism’s capacity to 
produce these behaviors in response to environmental cir-
cumstances that was selected for. This capacity is of course 
invisible in field studies.
In the next two sections, I will consider developmental 
plasticity and niche construction in greater detail because 
they exemplify the different methodological and ontological 
commitments underpinning current evolutionary explana-
tions. They also provide clear opportunities for outdoor edu-
cators to engage students in understanding, exploring, and 
participating in their biological worlds, as will be discussed 
later in the article.
Developmental Plasticity Theory
The developmental plasticity approach to thinking about 
evolutionary novelty is most closely associated with the 
work of West-Eberhard (2003, 2005) and Kirschner and Ger-
hart (2005), among others. As noted above and elaborated 
upon here, this approach foregrounds the role that the organ-
ism plays in negotiating its environments, and the import this 
role has on evolution. In so doing, it acknowledges observa-
ble macroscopic variations, such as atypical form and behav-
ior, as potentially significant evolutionary novelty. Organ-
isms are seen as causal actors, or agents, in the production of 
2 According to Dennett (1995), such critiques are levelled at straw-
men because no one would seek to explain adaptationally why an 
elephant has more legs than eyes. As Dennett sees it, it is easy for MS 
and neo-Darwinism to incorporate such critiques: the morphospace 
of possibilities for natural selection is not continuous. It is filled with 
many holes, genetic and morphological regions that simply cannot be 
filled.
3 Moreover, in what ways can organisms subsequently utilize non-
adapted traits for adaptive purposes, in a process some evolutionists 
call "exaptation" (Gould and Vrba 1982)? In a particular case, how 
could we find any of this out? And what learning contexts and envi-
ronments best assist learners in doing so?
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new form and behavior (Walsh 2015). According to the logic 
of developmental plasticity theory, once beneficial novelties 
are produced, natural selection then works on tweaking the 
regulatory genes that facilitate the reappearance of these new 
features. This reversal makes genes often the followers rather 
than the leaders in evolution (West-Eberhard 2003, 2005). 
As we shall see, as opposed to gene-centric approaches that 
increasingly conduct research in laboratories, developmental 
plasticity theory implies field investigation as an important 
method to witness such evolution in action.
West-Eberhard (2003) defines developmental plasticity as 
the change(s) an organism makes to its form, state, move-
ment, or the rate of its activity in response to its external 
and internal environments (2003, pp. 32–33). Her concep-
tion is very general and encompassing, as it includes “active 
and passive, reversible and irreversible, and continuous and 
discontinuous responses” (2003, p. 36) under that single 
term. The educational significance of each shall be briefly 
discussed in the paragraphs that follow. For West-Eberhard, 
the plastic possibilities of a phenotype are not to be taken 
as a range of options preprogrammed by a genotype (which 
would slide into gene-centered adaptationist logic). The first 
reason for this is developmental: the phenotype (such as the 
egg cell) precedes the genotype and itself already conditions 
how and when DNA will be translated and transcribed based 
on its structure and context. A bottom-up causal explana-
tion of organismic development not only fails to capture 
this reciprocal determination between the organism pheno-
type and genome, it also ignores the fact that genomes are 
only causally efficacious as information when situated in 
information-constituting developing phenotypes (Oyama 
2000), which is why DNA outside of its cellular context is 
inert (Noble 2015). A second reason is ecological: environ-
ments are very dynamic and themselves evolving in complex 
ways, so it is unlikely that all seemingly adaptive traits and 
behaviors in a given organism are purely the result of prior 
selection.
Before going on, it is useful to clarify some elements of 
West-Eberhard’s definition. The first point is her insistence 
that plasticity is a response to internal and external environ-
ments. For West-Eberhard, as for others working within evo-
lutionary developmental biology, the genome is considered 
to be part of the organism’s environment. This would seem 
incongruent from a gene-centrist ontology, but it asserts 
the system-level importance of the organism as a whole. 
Without this, it is difficult to understand how an organism 
turns on and off certain genes or alternatively splices genes 
to different effects in response to factors that it as a whole 
is dealing with. A second advantage is that factors in the 
external environment and those in the internal environment 
have causal parity in how they influence the organism and in 
how the organism adapts or refashions these factors to suit 
its needs (Oyama 2000). Instead of the organism conceived 
as the by-product of a genetically determined system modu-
lated by an environment, it is seen rather as a system regulat-
ing and responding to contingencies within and outside of 
itself. The most memorable example West-Eberhard gives in 
illustration of this process is a domestic goat born with only 
two legs. The goat accommodated this abnormality through 
a coordinated series of anatomical, physiological, and 
behavioral changes. It walked in upright posture and devel-
oped very particular muscular and skeletal specializations, 
manifesting in its integration similarities with a kangaroo’s 
morphology including an elongated neck (2003, pp. 51, 52). 
For West-Eberhard, phenotypic changes induce changes in 
gene regulation and expression too,4 which in turn facilitate 
phenotypic accommodation (2003, p. 147). In some sense, 
it does not matter at what level the initial novelty arose, 
be it through genetic abnormality, fetal chemical exposure, 
or through having its legs amputated at birth. In any case, 
phenotypic changes are coordinated and systemic, inducing 
cascades of responses within and without. Morphological 
plasticity is driven by behavioral plasticity, which is itself a 
goal-oriented organismic activity.
West-Eberhard’s refusal to distinguish between active 
and passive plasticity is a direct consequence of this posi-
tion. Williams (1992a) argued that things like tree branches 
breaking in the wind and babies’ heads changing shape as 
they pass through birth canals are passive modifications, by 
which he means mere susceptibilities to influence. Because 
no metabolic or physiological work goes into these pheno-
typic changes, Williams asserts it is misleading to think of 
these as plasticity. West-Eberhard refuses this distinction 
on several important grounds,5 one of which is particularly 
relevant for educators working in the outdoors. Even if it is 
possible to imagine a passively acquired trait, it will not stay 
passive for long. Take the two-legged goat as an example. 
As it ambles around the field, its morphology coherently 
connecting together into a functional gait, we might ask: 
what part of its behavior was acquired passively and what 
part was an active readjustment? In many cases, an organ-
ism might exacerbate the difference between it and more 
species-typical organisms as it learns to live. Organisms 
transform themselves to render potentially deleterious traits 
more viable. Exaptation (Gould and Vrba 1982) is in this 
sense a developmental process. This is a crucial point for 
educators because it means atypical variation is largely the 
4 Shapiro (2011) has convincingly shown somatic cell DNA effec-
tively functions as a read–write storage system.
5 As she sees it, Williams is attempting to smuggle adaptationism 
back into his explanatory framework because all allegedly genuine 
plastic responses are seen to have been evolutionarily selected for in 
that organism’s ancestral history. In other words, he wants to pull in 
a repertoire of available programmed responses that would not allow 
for contingent adaptive novelty.
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product of capacities rather than mutated programs, and of 
resilience rather than determinism.
The second dualism developmental plasticity theory 
challenges is between reversible and irreversible plasticity. 
Stearns (1989) suggested the word “plasticity” be confined 
to discussions of irreversible responses to the environment, 
while the term “flexibility” be employed for cases where new 
behavior or form can be extinguished as necessary. The two-
legged goat is an example of an irreversible response, while 
the folding leaves of a Mimosa pudica plant can be seen as 
reversible insofar as they reliably return to normal. How-
ever, whether or not a trait is reversible is a somewhat subtle 
issue. Many allegedly reversible behaviors do not, strictly 
speaking, put the organism back to some prior baseline of 
its development. The fact that the organism has produced a 
response to its environment bears its mark anatomically and 
physiologically, evidenced when subsequent interaction with 
that stimulus leads to changes in the rate, strength, or type of 
response. Indeed, there is evidence M. pudica habituate leaf-
folding behavior when an atypical though harmless stimu-
lus is repeatedly applied to them (Gagliano 2014).6 Outside 
of gulls, crows, and squirrels, in many temperate contexts 
habituation is not easy to identify outdoors because most 
organisms that habituate quickly (i.e., animals) appear but 
fleetingly, while sessile organisms (such as fungi and plants) 
will normally respond within a time frame unusable in most 
education contexts. Nevertheless, habituation demonstrates 
the ubiquity of plastic responses across the biological world. 
It is useful to invite students to think about whether or not 
the behavior of organisms they experience outdoors are 
"genetically determined," habituated, or both, and what that 
difference might mean.
Finally, the difference between continuous and discon-
tinuous variation is also seen as misleading because it posits 
another distinction in kind that can be adequately explained 
through similar underlying processes. Continuous varia-
tions are seen as graded responses (such as skin tanning or 
acclimatization) whereas a discontinuous response is taken 
to refer to qualitative jumps in the behavior or form of the 
organism (such as polyphenisms and some types of learn-
ing). Though not essential to the argument of this article, 
I will point out in passing that threshold points mediate 
whether or not a response is continuous or discontinuous, 
but such threshold points are themselves also subject to vari-
ous environmental influences (which may also have their 
own threshold points; see West-Eberhard 2003, Chap. 5). 
As for the prior discussions about activity and reversibil-
ity, there is no simple correlation between whether or not 
a response is continuous and whether or not it is adaptive.
Connecting back to our main discussion, it is worth sum-
marizing that from a developmental plasticity theory per-
spective, it is difficult to make any a priori statement as to 
whether a particular trait is the adapted product of past selec-
tion, a malfunction or irrelevant side effect of some process 
or interaction (see Griffiths 2008), or a developed adaptive 
response to contingently lived situations. Even species-wide 
features merely reflect the fact that during development cer-
tain environmental variables are so constant and predict-
able organisms reliably reinvent stereotypical responses 
that therefore appear to be genetically programmed (Oyama 
2000). In other words, in taking a systems theoretic view, 
developmental plasticity theory resists the idea of preforma-
tionist genetic information residing in the genome in favor of 
the notion that information is constructed by the organism 
during its ontological development (see Oyama et al. 2001).
From the developmental plasticity theory perspective, in 
what sense are genes said to be followers rather than leaders 
in evolutionary novelty? At face value, this seems to resur-
rect the notion of inheriting acquired traits, an idea proposed 
by Lamarck (1809) and routinely ridiculed through most of 
the 20th century. “Lamarkism” has been considered heretic 
as it defies the impermeability of the Weismannian barrier 
(see above), which states the germline is sequestered from 
the somatic line, so information cannot pass from the body 
back into the sex cells.7 But plasticity theorists do not usu-
ally rely on neo-Lamarckian mechanisms to support their 
notion that acquired novelties eventually get encoded in 
the genetic inheritance of the organism. One mechanism, 
known as "genetic assimilation," suggests that plasticity 
enables organisms to buy time, with stochastic gene varia-
tion catching up later on to automatize the beneficial novelty 
with less energetic burden (Waddington 1953; Goldschmidt 
1940; Schmalhausen [1949]1986; see Schlichting and Wund 
2014). Another view focuses on the immediate microevolu-
tion conferred by plasticity, noting organisms more able to 
plastically accommodate their environments are more likely 
to produce offspring, leading to the increased prevalence of 
7 Such a view clearly takes an animal-centric bias when describ-
ing evolutionary process (in plants and fungi, sex cells emerge out 
of mature somatic cells, while bacteria directly pass their acquired 
genes to each other through horizontal gene transfer). However, even 
in animals, gametes are not originally separated. For example, prior 
to oocytogenesis, there is a developmental period during which the 
somatic cells undergo environmental influences. There is also accu-
mulating evidence indicating the extent to which epigenetic changes 
to the genome are passed on (Jablonka and Lamb 1999, 2005; Gissis 
and Jablonka 2011). These include methylation, chromatin changes, 
and histone modifications.
6 The experiment consisted of a controlled drop system that would 
safely slide potted mimosa plants down a shaft. Gagliano et  al.’s 
intention was to repeatedly subject the plants to a treatment that 
induces a response but which is clearly nonadaptive in that it is eco-
logically unlikely to occur. For my own part, I noticed M. pudica near 
the side of well-trodden paths are less likely to fold their leaves and 
discussed it anecdotally (see Affifi 2011).
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genes that allow such modifications to flexibly arise again 
in the next generation. For West-Eberhard, "genetic accom-
modation" follows "phenotypic accommodation." A benefi-
cial plastic response is generated more or less automatically 
in future generations not primarily through the subsequent 
evolution of entirely new genes, but through the tweaking 
of existing ones that regulate the threshold for such a plastic 
response (West-Eberhard 2003). As should be clear from 
these examples, the organism is thereby instated as a caus-
ally significant contributor to the ongoing process of adap-
tive evolution.
As educators, we might therefore follow William Bate-
son’s advice and treasure the exceptions we find to typical 
species phenotypes (Cock and Forsdyke 2008). But to treas-
ure them, we must first of all be able to witness them and this 
is where the outdoors comes in as a crucial space to observe 
moments of potential evolutionary significance. A given 
trait may not be adapted in the sense of having been vet-
ted through a prior evolutionary history. But it may become 
adaptive, in Kampourakis’ (2013) second sense described 
above, insofar as that organism is trying out, inventing, or 
stumbling upon novel possible means of accommodating its 
diverse environments that may later become increasingly 
mechanized. An educator might provoke such thinking 
in their students by asking them to observe carefully and 
hypothesize whether some atypical feature may or may not 
be adaptive in this sense. The presence of traits and behav-
iors that seem to functionally assist the organism is not nec-
essarily an indication that these traits have been determined. 
Species-typical behavior is a statistical construction and few 
in a given population may actually behave prototypically, 
while some may be significant outliers. These variations may 
be crucial to evolution even if they are not (yet) the result 
of underlying genetic differences. Population sampling is 
an effective way of seeing differences within phenotypes 
within a species, but in our case it is carried out with a very 
different purpose than to merely seek out generalities. In 
other words, sampling can be carried out for nomothetic and 
idiographic ends, the latter aiming to identify and study the 
emergence of particular and unique cases.
After discussing our second important concept, niche 
construction and the relationship between it and develop-
mental plasticity, I will review how this changed under-
standing of the organism has important implications for 
articulating and conducting naturalistic fieldwork in outdoor 
education settings.
Niche Construction Theory
Standard MS models assume an organism’s environment 
changes so slowly that it can be treated as a constant. 
According to this view, the phenotypic expression of the 
genome is tested for viability against a relatively steady 
ecological context, and adapted organisms are seen to have 
inherited traits fit for pre-established niches.8 In the voice 
of one influential proponent, “adaptation is always asym-
metrical; organisms adapt to their environment, never vice 
versa” (Williams 1992b, p. 484), a view known as explana-
tory “externalism” in evolutionary theory (Godfrey-Smith 
1996). Following population geneticist Lewontin (e.g., 
1983), scholars produced an alternative view acknowledg-
ing the dynamic role of the organism in shaping its envi-
ronment, and the significance of this as an evolutionary 
process. Much of this work constellates around the term 
“niche construction” which can be defined as “the process 
whereby organisms, through their metabolism, their activi-
ties, and their choices, modify their own and/or each other’s 
niches” (Odling‐Smee et al. 2003, p. 419). Niche construc-
tion theorists assert that niche construction modifies envi-
ronments in ecologically and evolutionarily consequential 
ways, with effects on natural selection (Odling-Smee 1988; 
Turner 2000; Odling-Smee et al. 2003; Laland et al. 2016).9 
Empirically, this phenomenon has been observed and mod-
elled in the field (Laland et al. 1996, 1999; Kerr et al. 1999). 
Niche construction theory leads to a number of different 
consequences which, like developmental plasticity theory, 
foreground organisms as systems theoretic agents in evolu-
tionary processes.
While the focus of MS is often on the evolution of organ-
isms, niche construction theory concentrates explicitly 
on the coevolution of organisms and their environment. 
Because organisms modify their external environments 
through living, there is no fixed “selective environment” 
(Brandon 1990) vetting organisms as externalists presume. 
To varying degrees, organisms change and in part determine 
the selection pressures affecting them (Odling-Smee et al. 
2003). Organisms tend to alter their selection pressures in 
directed ways that benefit their survival, and this accounts 
for some of the complementarity we observe between 
8 In adaptionist explanations, it is important that the context is seen 
as constant precisely because the evolutionary mechanisms (gradual 
stochastic genetic micromutations selected for by relatively con-
stant environmental pressures, or drifting due to a relative lack of 
such pressures) are assumed to work so slowly. Were the environ-
ment dynamic in any significant sense, then the gradualistic nature 
of evolution would be unlikely to ever be an effective cause of exist-
ing adaptations. As a result, to protect the viability of the simplifying 
assumptions behind MS, the ontological relevance of the organism 
had to be undermined in favor of the theoretical importance of chang-
ing genes and their selective environments. This has led to blinkers 
put up against considering the role that organisms play in adaptively 
shaping their own and others’ environments.
9 For the purposes of this article, I do not make a distinction between 
“niche construction” (Odling-Smee et al. 2003) and “ecosystem engi-
neering” (Jones et  al. 1994, 1997). See Godfrey-Smith (2017) for a 
discussion of these two terms.
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organisms and their environments. Many of these changes 
can have transgenerational and cross-species effects when 
niches are inherited (Badyaev and Uller 2009; Odling-Smee 
2010). Finally, niche-construction activities may or may not 
be adaptations in the Darwinian sense of being traits previ-
ously selected for as they confer survival advantage. Some 
favorable activities may be adaptive because they have been 
learned, invented, mimicked, or otherwise acquired, a fact 
pervasive across the biosphere but particularly evident in 
human culture. Like developmental plasticity theory, niche 
construction theory also therefore identifies and studies 
adaptive traits and behaviors in Kampourakis’ (2013) second 
sense. In other words, if developmental plasticity theory tells 
us organisms are not passive vehicles of acquired units of 
information (genes), then niche construction theory asserts 
organisms are also not passive targets of selection (Avital 
and Jablonka 2000).
Employing the outdoors in understanding niche construc-
tion is both easy and imperative. It is imperative because 
without experiencing the daily activities of actual organisms, 
one is tempted to ignore what role those activities might 
have on the world around them. This indeed is just what 
often happens in MS reasoning.10 Employing the outdoors 
is easy because all organisms are doing things to get by. 
When biology teachers and environmental educators take 
learners out into the field to study behavior first hand, they 
might initiate activities like asking learners to list ways they 
think a particular tree is affecting its context. Once volatile 
organic compounds, leaf litter, cellular respiration, tropism, 
and effects of shading are taken into account, it becomes 
increasingly obvious that a tree is modifying its environ-
ment. For example, shading leads to favoring different plant 
growth in the adjacent regions. Depending on the particu-
lar architecture of the tree, different amounts of light filter 
into the canopy, which creates a context where the tree is 
competing and cooperating with a different set of organ-
isms than when it set out as a seedling. And of course, the 
tree also becomes its own environmental pressure in a more 
direct sense: the shade it casts upon itself leads it to grow in 
particular ways.
While these sorts of effects are sometimes labelled 
“extended phenotypes” according to a gene-centered view 
of evolution11 (Dawkins 1982), gene-centered accounts are 
incomplete because they simply widen the scope of what is 
considered the effect of genes without positioning the devel-
oping organism as a causal locus in the process. Dawkins’ 
approach is adaptationist because the same logic is applied, 
just at a broader scale. Resorting to explanations that rely on 
stable selection pressures in some deep past, this approach 
de-emphasizes the possibility that the effects of organismic 
behavior might be the consequence of novel responses gen-
erated to emerging contingencies. Through positive feed-
back, niche construction initiates developmental, ecological, 
and evolutionary momentum effects, and through negative 
feedback, dynamic inertia or equilibria in these same inter-
connected systems (Laland et al. 1996; Creanza and Feld-
man 2014).
Sometimes niche construction builds up effects over 
time, leading organisms to inherit niches created by others. 
Organisms are born into ecosystems that are the product of 
various organisms engaged in modifying their own selective 
environments (Odling-Smee 2010). An example of this is 
worm casts (recognized and described by Darwin in an early 
observation of this phenomenon), which have compound-
ing effects on soil structure, humidity, and chemistry that 
alter the viability of the soil system for other species and 
for subsequent earthworms (Nuutinen 2010). As the worm 
is modifying the soil, other organisms are doing the same, 
implying that inherited niches are negotiated and dynamic. 
However, inherited niches are not always simply physico-
chemical. Parental care, inherited behavior, and animal tra-
ditions are all examples of intergenerational sociocultural 
niche construction (Avital and Jablonka 2000), and human 
language is also a semiotic landscape both constructed and 
passed on (Clark 2006), with similar ratcheting up effects 
through positive feedback (Deacon 2003) as occurs in other 
inherited niches. The products of niche inheritance are eas-
ily observable in the field but because they are often slow 
and accumulating, even something dynamic like social niche 
construction is unlikely witnessed. If the aim is to focus on 
the organism as a dynamic agent, the educator might take an 
organism’s directly observable environmental modifications 
as a point of departure and ask whether or not they lead to 
lasting effects for the various species present.
10 More specifically, MS is happy to assert organisms alter their envi-
ronments, but maintains such changes can be treated as a background 
condition rather than a source of evolutionary innovation (e.g., Dawk-
ins 1982). If organisms have been previously selected to behave in 
certain ways, then their environmental influences are themselves sta-
ble and predictable and will simply serve as part of the selective envi-
ronment. This can (and is) studied outdoors, but reduces all organism 
behavior to the repetitive effects of prior selection. Niche construction 
can restore the organism as participant and collaborator in evolution, 
lending intrigue and urgency to studying behavior in field conditions.
11 According to Dawkins (1982), if genes are the main causal agents 
that induce upward effects, it is arbitrary to designate the phenotype 
as merely the body and behavior of the organism. Worm castings, leaf 
litter, beaver dams, and human technologies would all be seen as part 
of a broader phenotype.
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Unifying Development Plasticity and Niche 
Construction Theories: Reciprocal Causality 
and the Adaptive Subject
At root in both developmental plasticity and niche construc-
tion is an issue about the nature of causality. A metaphysics 
that assumes causality can only be bottom-up, with higher-
level phenomena necessarily and sufficiently explained 
according to lower-level mechanisms, will not grasp the 
novelty-generating and causally efficacious processes that 
emerge from the behavior of the organism itself. While 
bottom-up explanation can articulate how a system’s parts 
interact to produce an organism, in emergent processes such 
as living organisms the capacities of those parts exist by vir-
tue of their being integrated and regulated by the organism’s 
activity. This latter phenomenon, sometimes called “down-
ward causation,” has been articulated in different ways (e.g., 
Juarrero 1999; Thompson 2007; Walsh 2015; Godfrey-Smith 
2017). Because of downward causation, niche construction 
is not merely the effect of an extended phenotype.12 When 
niche-constructing organisms sense, integrate, and respond 
to environmental information, their constructed niche is 
part of the organism’s context that permits, constrains, and 
regulates gene action. Similarly, its plastic possibilities are 
not simply a range of available responses preset genetically 
because these responses reemploy genetic resources to new 
ends. The integration of mechanical (efficient) causality and 
downward causation leads to the concept of reciprocal cau-
sation (Laland et al. 2012).
Reciprocal causation between an organism and its envi-
ronments is indicative of a fundamental conceptual shift 
towards recognizing the developing organism as a subject 
(Godfrey-Smith 2017). According to this Godfrey-Smith, 
a subject is an entity that has (1) a point of view on the 
world and (2) an agenda (2017, pp. 4–5). Having a “point of 
view” means an organism is sensing and integrating infor-
mation from a situated spatiotemporal location. Having an 
“agenda” means the organism acts in response to this infor-
mation to further its needs. While it might be tempting to 
categorize these two aspects as something like “sentience” 
and “behavior,” both aspects of Godfrey-Smith’s subjectivity 
are fundamentally interconnected. On the one hand, sen-
sory organs are not passive (Dewey 1963). They actively 
track relevant environmental features. On the other, ongoing 
activity is continuously sensed and fed back to the organism 
(for example, in animals this occurs through propriocep-
tion). More shall be said about Dewey’s analysis shortly. 
For now, it is sufficient to understand how Godfrey-Smith’s 
description of the organism as a subject helps articulate how 
it enables and sustains reciprocal causation between itself 
and its interactants.
The concept of niche construction emerged from popu-
lation genetics rather than developmental biology, and has 
a correspondingly different emphasis. Nevertheless, both 
developmental plasticity and niche construction are in many 
ways complementary descriptions of an organism-centered 
view of life. It is increasingly acknowledged that “to develop 
is to interact with the environment” (Schwab and Moczek 
2017, p. 4; emphasis added). This insight has led to attempts 
to combine developmental plasticity and niche construction 
theories. Both seek to replace the linear causality assumed 
in gene-centric models with one of reciprocal causation con-
stituted through ongoing feedback loops between organisms 
and their environments (Laland et al. 2008). Phenotypic 
modifications and changed ecological relations are insepa-
rable aspects of a single integrated dynamic.
While evolutionary developmental biologists focus more 
often on an organism’s plastic responses to its environment, 
niche constructionists focus instead on an organism’s effects 
on its environment. However, as Laland et al. (2008) point 
out, many in both research programs refuse to draw sharp 
lines (see, for example, Lewontin 1983; Oyama et al. 2001; 
West-Eberhard 2003; and Jablonka and Lamb 2005). A 
particularly fruitful convergence between these two areas 
is found in recent niche construction work which consid-
ers development as the ongoing process of constructing and 
responding to external and internal environments (Laland 
et al. 2016; Gilbert et al. 2015). As Laland et al. (2016) 
summarize, “[i]t can be seen that niches and environments 
exist inside the body, whilst physiological processes operate 
outside it” (p. 2420), because organisms actively regulate 
both their internal and external contexts in ways often biased 
towards increased viability. However, the integration is even 
tighter than portrayed here, because a changed external envi-
ronment will afford different organismic responses, while 
new behavior will change the external environment in turn 
(Walsh 2015).13
12 For some niche construction theorists, phenomena that can be 
legitimately considered extended phenotypes are niche constructions, 
but not all niche constructions are extended phenotypes. For instance, 
according to Laland et  al. (2016), niche construction theory accepts 
acquired behavior as a cause and does not attribute all construction 
activity to the direct or indirect expression of genes. It also recog-
nizes how positive feedback creates inherited niches. These are not 
accepted in extended phenotype explanations. From a developmental 
systems theory point of view (Oyama, see the third section) and the 
view promoted in this article, the concept of an extended phenotype 
would be even less defensible. While it might describe some phenom-
ena, it does not adequately take into account the shift in causality that 
arises in organic systems.
13 An additional point of confluence is the fact that developmental 
plasticity, especially in cases of population-wide responses to envi-
ronmental shifts, can lead to significant evolutionary impacts by sys-
temically modifying the selective environment.
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A similar ontological shift is behind the reasoning of both 
developmental plasticity theory and niche construction. In 
each, evolutionary change is seen as instigated and directed 
by the organism. While MS is wedded to the view that evolu-
tionary novelty arises through random gene changes, devel-
opmental plasticity theory claims it is often the result of 
phenotypic accommodation, and niche construction theory 
asserts it can be brought about by how an organism actively 
modifies its environment, which in turn affects it and other 
species. As adaptive agent, the organism is an effective 
causal nexus and its drive to survive pushes the evolutionary 
process forward. In this way, teleological reasoning returns 
to natural history, not in the sense of fathoming the whim of 
a transcendent creator (Paley 1809), nor as a heuristic stance 
(Mayr 1974), but instead as an aspect of how organisms 
modify themselves and others based on their needs and pur-
poses (Thompson 2007; Walsh 2015). In responding to con-
tingent conditions as opportunities or impediments, organ-
isms innovate life strategies that can become entrenched in 
the heredity of the organism-environment system, be it in 
genes, behaviors, or ecological features and their integration. 
Life leads evolution, coopting genetic resources and altering 
selection pressures through its cunningness. This ontologi-
cal shift invites us to consider real organisms negotiating 
real conditions. It invites educators to get outdoors and start 
paying attention to what is around them.
Developmental plasticity and niche construction can be 
thought of as related to one another in a way analogous to 
the two aspects of Godfrey-Smith’s “subject.” According 
to Dewey, the distinction between sensing and acting men-
tioned a few paragraphs back is made for pragmatic meth-
odological reasons but is not an ontological distinction. 
However, all of the splits discussed in this section result 
from taking apart relations established through reciprocal 
causality and not putting them back together again after 
analysis. Niche construction theory places more focus on 
the environmental effects of being a subject and develop-
mental plasticity theory on the responsive side, but these are 
points of emphasis made for pragmatic reasons rather than 
on ontological distinction.
According to Godfrey-Smith, the word “agency” fore-
grounds one half of this two-sided coin, but I believe Walsh’s 
(2015) use of the term captures this Deweyan dynamic, so 
in this article, I use the terms interchangeably. For Walsh, 
agency
consists in a capacity of the system to pursue goals, 
to respond to the conditions of its environment and its 
internal constitution in ways that promote the attain-
ment, and maintenance of its goal states. Agency is 
observable in the sense that what we see when we 
observe an agent is its dynamics, the way that the agent 
negotiates its situation (2015, p. 210).
As Walsh suggests, this concept of subjectivity or agency 
is not merely an internal or qualitative phenomenon inacces-
sible to empirical study, as dualistic notions related to domi-
nant approaches to behaviorism posit and reject (e.g., Skin-
ner 1938). Specifically, an organism’s agency is revealed 
in how it organizes and responds to its ongoing interaction 
with its internal and external environments. I suggest the 
word adaptive subject to capture the idea of a subject in 
the Godfrey-Smith/Walsh perspective, actively contributing 
to evolutionary processes through engaging in observable 
adaptive (in Kampourakis’ (2013) second sense) activity 
through constituting reciprocally causal interactions with 
its inner and outer environments. In the final section of this 
article, I will sketch out reasons why I think imagining an 
organism’s point of view is an important educational process 
facilitated by interaction and observation.
Learning Evolution Outdoors
Putting students into contact with nature can be done in 
many different ways, from unguided experiences to those 
mediated in various ways by caregivers, educators, and 
media. As such, merely asserting that students ought to 
learn evolution outdoors is broad and possibly miseducative. 
Approaches are needed that scaffold student current under-
standings and misunderstandings to the broader purpose of 
acquainting them with instances that exemplify organisms 
as adaptive subjects participating in evolution. Constructing 
such learning opportunities demands knowledge of ecologi-
cal processes, the affordances of teaching locations, and the 
thoughtful and skillful involvement of the outdoor educator 
in maximizing learning opportunities. Teasing out the effects 
of these encounters is a difficult task, compounded by the 
potentially contradictory encounters that can occur during 
a single experience or sequentially. For instance, if students 
are already habituated to observe other species in typological 
ways, further observation without appropriate prodding can 
sometimes actually reinforce their stereotypes. This should 
be an attractive challenge for a committed educator but will 
need support through professional pre- or in-service learn-
ing opportunities.
If a primary purpose of outdoor learning is to foster a 
different sort of relationship and understanding of the natu-
ral world through sustained interaction with it (Chen-Hsuan 
Cheng and Monroe 2012; Christie and Higgins 2012; Nazir 
and Pedretti 2016), it is of critical importance to examine 
how people mediate these interactions through theory and 
experience. It is my position that the ubiquitous use of MS 
explanations does more harm than good by fostering an atti-
tude that collapses the teleology, novelty, and the subjec-
tivity/agency of other organisms. Relying on adaptationist 
explanations means seeing evolution as something that has 
Engaging the Adaptive Subject: Learning Evolution Beyond the Cell Walls 
1 3
basically already happened, and the organism as the mind-
less by-product of biochemical mechanisms selected for long 
ago. Not only is this an inaccurate account of the actual 
diversity, contingency, and innovation of the organic world, 
it is also a destructive premise by which to approach other 
beings. Outdoor learning offers direct experiences with phe-
nomena that put science back into the immediate sensuous 
lifeworld of an inquirer. Dewey wrote, “the senses are the 
organs through which the live creature participates directly 
in the on-goings of the world about him. In this participation 
the varied wonder and splendor of this world are made actual 
for him in the qualities he experiences” (2005, p. 22). How 
might we bring the zebras and butterflies back into splendor?
As suggested in this article, theory and learning con-
text mutually inform one another in various ways. Certain 
approaches, such as the MS, lead to an increased focus on 
indoor learning contexts, which in turn can lead to increased 
"indoor theory" that can be easily created, understood, and 
explored without spending significant time engaging with 
the actual processes and interactions one is attempting to 
describe or explain. On the other hand, even environmental 
educators working outdoors are susceptible to reproducing 
dominant MS reasoning in the face of evidence that might 
reveal its inadequacy. What is urgently needed is a comple-
mentarity between agential models in biology and learning 
contexts that enable students to observe and build upon these 
understandings.
In this vein, I summarize and expand upon some 
approaches that might be taken by educators.
• Educators should encourage observation by seeking out 
differences between cases instead of merely commonali-
ties (for instance, individuals within a population of a 
given species). One activity might be to encourage stu-
dents to find cases where organisms do not behave or 
look like their textbook descriptions (Affifi 2019a, b). 
Developing such a faculty of observation can be assisted 
by various arts, such as drawing and painting, which 
focus the eye and mind on grasping phenomena in their 
particularity. Gardening is also a way of developing a 
daily practice to engage with particular organisms as 
opposed to general abstractions and/or statistical gener-
alities for given species.
• Educators should stimulate students’ consideration of 
how atypical differences may be adaptive, even if atypi-
cal for the species (and therefore not necessarily evolu-
tionarily selected). This may be easier with some species 
than others.
• As an activity, students can sample and survey the range 
of phenotypic variation within a population for the pur-
poses of developing understanding of how environments 
allow diversity to flourish, and to counteract the idea that 
natural selection (and/or drift14) is a necessary and suf-
ficient explanation of observed traits.
• Educators also need to scaffold observation into how nov-
elty begets novelty. New phenotypic forms or behaviors 
lead to (and are produced by) new types of ecological 
relationships, so a web of difference may be visible. In 
addition, the ways an ecological disturbance, such as the 
spread of an invasive species in an area, creates a rapid 
cascade of corresponding shifts among interacting organ-
isms, would be a suitable area for naturalistic investiga-
tion. Inherited niches may also be considered.
• Educators can also take advantage of opportunities to 
foster interdisciplinary learning (IDL). For instance, a 
number of important mathematical concepts are deeply 
connected with observing and learning about the pheno-
typic plasticity of organisms. For example, some plastic-
ity might not involve the development of a qualitatively 
novel trait but instead a rate of change at which some 
behavior occurs. Often, rates of change can really only 
be seen by plotting on a coordinate system against time.
• There are sometimes very interesting and abrupt “phase 
transitions” between behaviors or in the development of 
a new trait (West-Eberhard 2003). For example, just like 
a horse can increase its pace through trotting but at a cru-
cial point shifts into a gallop, quantitative increases in the 
biological world lead to qualitative changes at threshold 
points. At such points, the dynamic relationship between 
the parts of the organism is re-coordinated by the context 
of the system as a whole (see discussion of reciprocal 
causation above). It is important to understand that the 
parameters and variables governing a living organism are 
only valid within a certain range of conditions, and so 
mechanistic interpretations are always only locally appli-
cable. Seeking out phase transitions in the development 
and behavior of organisms points students to the limits 
of explanatory mechanism as a methodology in biology, 
with broader benefits for sustainability education, as dis-
cussed in the next section.
• There are opportunities to cultivate empathy as a scien-
tific approach to engaging with organisms as adaptive 
subjects. This point will be explored further in the next 
section.
14 Genetic drift (Wright 1948) is the process where the genetic com-
position of a population gradually changes over time owing to the 
chance intergenerational proliferation and disappearance of genes. It 
is a well-described phenomenon within the MS and features promi-
nently in school curricula. In my experience, it captures little of the 
imagination and explanatory labor of the average educator, however 
prevalent it may be. While antagonistic in spirit to doctrinaire adapta-
tionism, it still denies the causal agency of the organism in the evolu-
tionary process.
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Why New Conceptions of Evolution Matter 
for Sustainability Education
Over the last decades in particular, there has emerged 
a need for an interconnecting meta-paradigm that inte-
grates more strictly evolutionary studies, biodiversity 
studies and the ethical frameworks that are most appro-
priate for allowing a lasting coevolution between natu-
ral and social systems. Today such a need is more than 
a mere luxury, it is an epistemological and practical 
necessity. (Bergandi 2013, p. 1)
At this point, it is worthwhile to take a step back and 
examine why these alternative evolutionary explanations 
matter outside of being fascinating intellectual pursuits. 
Here, I hope to briefly convey two advantages for sustain-
ability education that arise from challenging the ubiquitous 
reliance on MS explanations. The first concerns the way we 
understand and respond to organisms adapting to a rapidly 
changing world. The second concerns the need and benefits 
of fostering empathetic attention to adaptive subjects around 
us.
The ontological shift from genes to organisms as agents in 
evolution is accompanied by the methodological shift from 
modeling generality to understanding particularity. Focus 
on common patterns and statistical generality has favored 
certain types of insights about nature over others. Biology 
is dominated by the method that seeks to “keep the type in 
mind and leave the single case, with all its accidents, alone” 
(Wentworth Thompson 1917, p. 271). Much of the ration-
ale for outdoor learning with respect to evolutionary theory 
is to counteract some of the theoretical assumptions this 
approach has helped carve in scientists’ minds. While the 
fact that species are composed of unique individuals accom-
modating and altering their environments can be taught in 
the classroom, the diverse and rich ways individual organ-
isms do so is best experienced, and the best place to do this 
is in the field. If the accident—or “token” in philosophical 
language—is as important as the “type,” then we need to 
consider the organism within its environment. In some fields 
such as psychiatry, the distinction between token and type 
has led to two different approaches to research, sometimes 
labelled idiographic and nomothetic (Windelband and Oakes 
[1894]1980). I have explored elsewhere the relationship 
between these two ways of thinking and the need to inte-
grate them (Affifi 2019a, b). As this article has suggested, 
the unique attributes of “tokens” are often not accidental.
First, incorporating idiographic approaches suggested 
by these new theories of evolution can lead to  a more 
responsive attitude towards the ecological crisis. Because 
species’ behavior can change more dramatically over time 
than a gene-centered view of evolution would predict, we 
cannot presume a given species, invasive or otherwise, is 
necessarily expected to simply fulfil pre-established ecologi-
cal roles in unvarying (or very slowly varying) ways. Open-
ing awareness to this fact has important implications for 
reconstructing conservation and resource management. On 
the one hand, it implies conservationists need to appreciate 
organismic agency in their models and management plans. 
More broadly, it suggests ecological management is not only 
a profession but a universal dimension of human experience 
everyone must take more responsibility for. All humans are 
engaged in niche construction, be it through consumption, 
in their workplaces, or in their households. It is incumbent 
upon educators to prepare students to engage in niche con-
struction with sensitivity and responsiveness, recognizing 
that each person’s environment is itself also populated with 
sensitive and responsive niche-constructing beings.
As organisms negotiate changing climates, novel 
chemicals, and plastics, and otherwise altered habitats 
and resources, we should expect an increase in the kinds 
of novel responses discussed in this article. These may be 
observable as phenotypic structural changes, as novel eco-
logical behaviors, or as a combination of both. Learning to 
see these changes is not merely about understanding how 
evolution works, but about gaining a better understanding 
of how the biosphere is adapting—and failing to adapt—to 
anthropogenic threats. Sustainability education should there-
fore foster an attitude amongst both future scientists and the 
general public (and perhaps “citizen scientists”) that seeks to 
understand and articulate such changes, which consequently 
can inform more responsive management decisions. This 
is a far cry from typical natural history guides and surveys 
(e.g., Open Air Laboratories (OPAL) citizen scientist sur-
veys in the UK), which focus on identifying species’ typical 
organisms and their niches. Through this work, we may see 
some of the creative reconstruction life undergoes in the 
face of disturbance. This may provide a hopeful antidote 
to the gloomy scenarios predicted by evolutionary models 
that conceive organisms as fixed products of past selection 
and uniquely fit for very specific contexts disintegrating all 
around them. Creative response is all around us. However, 
it may not be quick enough for the scale and speed of the 
destruction, so the ontological shift indicated in this article 
does not imply we do not urgently need to protect existing 
habitats.
Second, experiential understanding of particular organ-
isms has the potential to stimulate the affective dimension 
of ecology. There is growing evidence "time in nature" has a 
significant impact on learners’ care for organisms and habi-
tats, and a sustainability orientation (Chen-Hsuan Cheng 
and Monroe 2012; Christie and Higgins 2012; Nazir and 
Pedretti 2016). This is a factor in the recent "Second Warn-
ing to Humanity" by Ripple et al., and over 15,000 scientist 
signatories (2017), where they offer a series of 13 urgent 
actions to stabilize and reverse biodiversity loss and climate 
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change. One of these is "increasing outdoor nature education 
for children as well as the overall engagement of society in 
the appreciation of nature" (2017, p. 3).
We are accustomed to thinking of learning, subjectiv-
ity, agency, sentience, creativity, and innovation as unique 
human capacities in an otherwise giant biochemical 
machine. However, the marvels of the natural world are not 
merely aesthetic wonders nor simply great green devices ful-
filling essential ecological services. They are the processes, 
products, and livelihoods of beings eking out an existence in 
a precarious world where they would scarcely fare well were 
they simply replaying a genetic tune in reaction to the con-
texts they inhabit. The evolutionary picture that foregrounds 
organisms as adaptive subjects restores continuity between 
humans and the rest of the biosphere. Both developmental 
plasticity theory and niche construction theory center the 
organism as a sensitive and responsive agent in develop-
ment, ecology, and evolution.
Though naive anthropomorphism muddles the scien-
tific aim of understanding phenomena, a commitment to 
avoiding it at all costs is equally naive (Smuts 2006; Affifi 
2014). The failure to recognize that organism subjectiv-
ity organizes reciprocally causal relations in other species 
is a consequence of this over-extended dogma. What is 
needed is a way of imagining the point of view of other 
organisms that is neither a simple projection of human 
consciousness nor the reductive application of forms of 
causality that deny the ontological importance of the 
organism. I believe what is needed is a “relational empa-
thy” that sees the development of a felt understanding of 
the other as an ongoing and fallible interactive process. 
Broome (1991) characterizes empathy as “a series of suc-
cessive approximations to the other’s point of view during 
social interaction” (p. 241). In its iterative engagement, 
empathy could be considered as something like a scientific 
approach to biological subjectivity in the sense described 
above. According to Godfrey-Smith’s (2014) interpretation 
of Kerr, communication is a process where an organism 
alters its phenotype while changing its niche. Given the 
arguments above, this should be an obvious but uninforma-
tive point. The details make it interesting and relevant for 
the present discussion. Signals are an important feature 
of communication in the biological world. Signaling is a 
behavioral modification and hence a phenotypic change, 
and it alters the sender’s environment through how it influ-
ences the receiver. On the other hand, receiving a signal 
also creates a phenotypic response, with consequences 
in turn for the receiver’s environment. For example, as 
I come to see how walking across the courtyard in front 
of my office affects our local magpie, I slow or soften my 
gait. This in turn is responded to. The magpie no longer 
jumps away so swiftly, rather it cocks its head pointing an 
eye right at my face, giving me a further sense about the 
point of view of that bird. As is clear, empathy’s “suc-
cessive approximations” are not gearing into a stable and 
preexisting corvid subjectivity, but into a point of view 
unique to this being and at least in part the product of its 
ongoing interactions. “Getting a feel for another organ-
ism” (as McClintock put it (Keller 2000)) through sus-
tained encounter inevitably leads to deeper understanding 
because one’s ideas and hypotheses are contextualized by 
the broader understanding that develops. Those with keen 
empathy, and this includes many great naturalists, with 
Darwin himself at the forefront, employ this strategy and 
their success can be attributed to it (see Ireland 2009). It 
can be powerful scientifically but also has wide implica-
tions for sustainability education through how it can foster 
a next generation that is inquisitive, admiring, and caring 
for the diverse subjects co-creating the world.
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